It is not yet a flood, but the trickles eroding the walls that keep China’s currency within the country’s territory are beginning to add up to something.

　　这一切还算不上洪流，但侵蚀中国外汇管制“大坝”的涓涓细流正开始汇聚成有意义之举。

　　Already last year, the renminbi debuted as a currency for bond financing by multinational corporations (McDonald’s); trade credits (to an Indonesian group by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China); and offshore deposit accounts (to the Bank of China’s personal banking clients in London, New York and other cities).

　　去年，人民币已经开始扮演了几种新角色：跨国公司（麦当劳(McDonald's)）的债券融资；贸易信贷（由中国工商银行(ICBC)向一家印尼集团提供）；以及海外储蓄账户（面向中国银行(BoC)在伦敦、纽约及其它一些城市的个人银行客户）。

　　Last week, further holes were pierced in the dam of non-convertibility. Pharo Management, a hedge fund manager, announced it will offer renminbi-denominated shares in its funds. The city of Wenzhou launched a pilot project to lighten restrictions on its residents’ ability to invest money offshore. And a year and a half after Chinese corporations were allowed to settle cross-border trades in their own currency, permission has also been granted to use renminbi to acquire or found new operations overseas.

　　上周，不可自由兑换的大坝上又被凿出更多洞孔：对冲基金管理公司发逻资产管理(Pharo Management)宣布将发行旗下基金的人民币计价股票；温州市启动一个试点项目，减轻对市民投资海外的限制；还有，中国企业在获准以本币结算跨境贸易一年半后，又获准使用人民币在海外进行收购或建立新业务。

　　That many of these moves make it easier to ship renminbi out of the country does not change the redback’s natural and favoured direction. If Chinese authorities were relaxing restrictions on capital inflows as freely as on outflows, the renminbi would have appreciated by more than the 3.5 per cent it has risen against the dollar since last year.

　　这些举措中有不少都使人民币更易流向海外，但这一事实改变不了人民币受人青睐的自然流向。如果中国官方像对待资本流出那样，放宽针对资本流入的限制，人民币的升值幅度将超出其自去年以来兑美元逾3.5%的升幅。

　　The fact that markets are hungrier to send money into China than out of it is why Beijing will remain wary of going beyond baby steps in capital account liberalisation. A more convertible currency would leave only two alternatives in current market conditions: allow a much higher exchange rate or let in huge, and potentially destabilising, capital flows.

　　市场更渴望向中国输送资金，而非把资金从中国转移到海外，这就是北京方面在开放资本账户方面仍然只敢迈出小步的原因。在目前的市场状况下，提高人民币的可自由兑换程度只能带来两种选择：一是允许汇率大幅提高，二是允许可能破坏稳定的大规模资本流入。

　　Yet taking a longer view, it is inconceivable that a rising economic giant will forever content itself with a pygmy currency. As trade ties between China and other emerging countries deepen, why use a third country’s money to invoice their transactions? Renminbi-denominated trade is catching on fast, rising to some $50bn worth of deals in the past six months – from zero two years ago.

　　然而，从更长远的视角看，难以想象一个不断崛起的经济巨人会永远满足于一种“侏儒货币”。随着中国加深与其它新兴国家的贸易联系，有什么理由在开具贸易发票时要使用另一国的货币？人民币计价的贸易正方兴未艾，在过去6个月期间增至大约500亿美元，而两年前这个数字为零。

　　And twinkling on the horizon – and surely in some Politburo members’ minds – stands the prize of global reserve currency status. Yet that could come only, if ever, after full convertibility and radical changes to China’s capital markets. That way lie big risks, a fundamental transformation of the Chinese economy, and a loss of control that China’s leaders will not tolerate any time soon.

　　在地平线上（肯定也在某些政治局委员的脑海中）闪闪发光的，还有“全球储备货币”地位这一荣耀。然而，要达到那一步，人民币必须首先实现全面可自由兑换，中国的资本市场也必须先完成彻底改革。这条道路上潜藏着很大风险，要求中国经济根本转型，还意味着中国领导人短时间内不会容忍的失去控制权。