“小额贷款”领域正在酝酿着信贷危机。

　　小额贷款是指世界各国发放贷款金额最小的一类业务。它主要是帮助贫民窟里和其它地方难以获得正常贷款的穷人为小吃摊、果树、奶牛等小工商业获得资金，以摆脱贫困。但是，作为帮助世界上最贫穷人口的一项社会实验而启动的这个项目也显示出具有获利的能力。

　　这吸引了私募股权基金和其他国外投资者，他们在过去几年里已向世界各地的小额贷款投入了数十亿美元。

　　据印度班加罗尔管理协会（Indian Institute of Management Bangalore）研究小额贷款问题的研究员卡玛斯（Rajalaxmi Kamath）说，其结果是：如今在印度，一些贫困地区正在受到贷款的“地毯式轰炸”。据新德里行业协会Sa-Dhan称，在印度，截至2008年3月31日当年的未偿小额贷款总额增长72%，达到12.4亿美元。

　　Finethic的格雷威尔（Jacques Grivel）说，我们担心出现泡沫，太多的钱都在追逐为数不多的好项目。Finethic是一只1亿美元的投资基金，重点关注拉丁美洲、东欧和亚洲，总部位于卢森堡，不过它在印度没有投资。

　　在印度南部的丝绸之乡拉马那家拉姆，Zahreen Taj注意到了这种变化。在她生活的这个破败的小镇，一夜之间许多人都想给她提供贷款。她借了125美元，投入到丈夫的蔬菜车上。后来她又借了更多钱。

　　46岁的Taj说，我从一家银行借款还上一家的钱。然后我再借钱。4年来，她总共从两家小额贷款机构借了4次钱，数额不断增大，两次是209美元，一次是293美元，还有一次是356美元。

　　她说，在她借贷的高峰期，她买了一台电视机。Taj说，小额贷款的出现增加了我们对还未拥有的东西的渴望。我们都有梦想。

　　现在，除了地板垫和一堆厨房用具之外，她的住房几乎是家徒四壁。在卖掉了电视、其它电器和珠宝后，她将债务降到了94美元。这大概是她年收入的四分之一。

　　在Taj生活的拉马那家拉姆，过高的贷款负担激发了社会紧张局势。许多借款人抱怨说，这些贷款的实际年利率高达24%至39%，结果是让很多人不堪重负。

　　今年7月，该镇有关部门要求印度央行限制贷款利率的上限，否则将吊销贷款人的执照。拉马那家拉姆副专员K.G. Jagdeesh在致印度央行的信中说，否则，目前的局势可能会在当地引发法律和秩序问题。

　　印度央行发言人Alpana Killawala在电子邮件中说，央行没有要求小额贷款机构设定最高利率，但会给它们施加压力，要求不要收取“过高的”利率。

　　与此同时，当地清真寺的领导人已开始告诉以穆斯林为主的社区不要偿还贷款。借款人都遵守了这个要求。

　　清真寺领导人也要求贷款人提供财务报表。贷款人说，它们不会遵守这点。

　　观察人士说，还贷风潮已蔓延到其它社区，包括附近Channapatna市，并可能在印度进一步扩散。

　　帮助小额贷款借款人从大银行贷款的公司FWWB India的Vijayalakshmi Das说，我们对此深感忧虑。她说，当地许多小额贷款提供商都没有重视风险管理，小额信贷需要从中吸取教训。

　　根据行业协会Sa-Dhan的一项调查，就全国来看，印度平均家庭的小额贷款负债在2004年至2009年期间增加了4倍左右，从约27美元增加到了约135美元。这个数字从全球标准来说显然微不足道。不过在印度农村地区，最贫穷家庭每周的生活费往往只有几美元。

　　一些观察人士指责小额贷款业务的根本性转变是导致这个问题的元凶。过去小额贷款机构都是侧重于社区服务的非营利机构。但最近几年来，许多规模较大的小额贷款公司都在印度央行注册为为营利性金融公司。这使它们面临着更严格的监管审查，但也获得了更广泛的融资渠道。

　　这种变化向更多的私募股权资金敞开了大门。总部位于钦奈的私募股权研究服务机构Venture Intelligence称，在过去18个月里印度银行和金融业达成的54项私募股权交易（总额11.9亿美元）中，小额贷款业占16项，交易总额至少为2.45亿美元。

　　在印度最贫穷的地区发放贷款似乎具有无法克服的风险。但投资者认为，农村地区基本没有受到全球经济衰退的冲击。

　　国际私募股权基金在2007年3月开始关注印度的小额信贷。当时来自硅谷的风险投资公司红杉资本（Sequoia Capital）参与了印度海得拉巴市SKS Microfinance Ltd.价值1，150万美元的股票发行。SKS Microfinance是世界上规模最大的小额贷款公司之一。

　　Venture Intelligence的Arun Natarajan说，SKS向这个行业展示了如何利用私募股权资金发展壮大。

　　此后涌现出了大量交易，投资者中包括波士顿的Sandstone Capital、旧金山的Valiant Capital和Silicon Valley Bank的下属公司SVB India Capital Partners.

　　世界银行发起设立的研究机构扶贫协商小组（Consultative Group to Assist the Poor）称，截止去年12月，全球共有100多只小额贷款投资基金，管理的资产总额约为65亿美元。

　　在过去一年中，投资者已向公司管理的规模最大的小额贷款基金投入了10多亿美元资金，增幅高达30%.扶贫协商小组称，新增融资将使该行业今年发放的贷款额比去年增加20%以上，其中大部分都流向了乌克兰、柬埔寨和波斯尼亚等国。

　　在拉马那家拉姆，Lalitha Sharma回忆起了7年前首家小额贷款公司到来时的情形。这是她那些住在贫民窟的同胞一个振奋人心的时刻：自由流动的货币。贷款员向每月收入只有9美元的人发放了贷款。

　　他们也来到了Sharma的家中。

　　她借了126美元。按照贷款条款，她说她会将这笔钱投在小生意上──她跟丈夫一起经营的小吃摊档。许多小额贷款提供商都要求贷款用于投资生意。

　　但今年29岁、有三个孩子的Sharma承认她撒了谎。她说，你必须说自己做生意才能获得贷款，不然就拿不到钱。

　　她用这笔钱付拖欠的帐单和给一家人买吃的。Sharma在一家工厂工作，给浸泡在沸水中的蚕茧抽丝，每周平均能挣8美元。

　　根据《华尔街日报》查到的贷款记录，她在接下来的四年里又从三家不同的贷款机构贷了四笔款，数额越来越大，分别为209、272、335和390美元。

　　班加罗尔的BSS Microfinance Private Ltd.也是贷款给Sharma的机构之一。该公司发言人拒绝置评她的借贷历史记录，称央行有隐私方面的规定。

　　今年她又贷了314美元，用于给小叔子办婚礼，贷款时她还是说钱是用来做生意的。

　　她还从另外两家小额贷款机构获得了贷款，数目分别为115美元和167美元，此外从位于班加罗尔的贷款机构Ujjivan借了251美元，又从Asmitha Microfin Ltd.借了230美元。

　　Ujjivan证实发放了三笔贷款。Asmitha的一名管理人员说，他那里有一笔贷款记录，借款人是拉马那家拉姆的居民，名叫Lalitha，但地址不一样。

　　Sharma说，我明白这是贷款，你得付利息，而且债务会越滚越多。但有时我们所面对的问题似乎只能通过再贷一笔款来解决。解决了一个，又会出现新的问题。

　　对于从美国信贷危机中得到教训的人来说，印度小额贷款中存在的许多问题都似曾相识。美国信贷危机因为所谓的“无需任何审查”贷款和收取佣金的贷款经纪人而加剧，批评人士认为，这种贷款经纪人缺乏审查借款者偿还能力的动力。

　　Kamath说，在印度也是如此，小额贷款机构的现场工作人员通常是拿佣金的，因此他们就有了财务上的动力，希望发放的贷款越多越好。

　　Ujjivan的创始人Samit Ghosh说，贷款机构也知道申请人常常在文件上造假。他说，事实上Ujjivan的现场工作人员常常都知道实情。但Ujjivan一直秉乘的政策是“信赖客户提供的信息，而不是我们自己的市场情报部门”。

　　他说，由于拉马那家拉姆的出现的问题，这项政策现在会加以改变。他表示，Ujjivan将会从中汲取教训，避免这种情况再度出现。

　　借款人将借来的钱花在哪里很难监控。Ujjivan曾经定期进行“贷款用途检查”，但因成本过高而停止。Ghosh说，现在只对贷款310美元以上者进行检查。

　　拉马那家拉姆的那段疯狂贷款的日子令一些居民苦恼不已。28岁的菜贩Alamelamma说，她本来从小额贷款中受益，但不知节制的借款人把我们其他人借款的机会也给毁了。

　　与她一沟之隔的Sharma却有不同看法：她希望小额贷款机构彻底从这一地区消失，不光是现在，而是永远滚蛋。

　　A credit crisis is brewing in 'microfinance，' the business of making the tiniest loans in the world.

　　Microlending fights poverty by helping poor people finance small businesses —— snack stalls， fruit trees， milk-producing buffaloes —— in slums and other places where it's tough to get a normal loan. But what began as a social experiment to aid the world's poorest has also shown it can turn a profit.

　　That has attracted private-equity funds and other foreign investors， who've poured billions of dollars over the past few years into microfinance world-wide.

　　The result： Today in India， some poor neighborhoods are being 'carpet-bombed' with loans， says Rajalaxmi Kamath， a researcher at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore who studies the issue. In India， microloans outstanding grew 72% in the year ended March 31， 2008， totaling $1.24 billion， according to Sa-Dhan， an industry association in New Delhi.

　　'We fear a bubble，' says Jacques Grivel of the Luxembourg-based Finethic， a $100 million investment fund that focuses on Latin America， Eastern Europe and Asia， though it has no exposure to India. 'Too much money is chasing too few good candidates.'

　　Here in Ramanagaram， a silk-making city in southern India， Zahreen Taj noticed the change. Suddenly， in the shantytown where she lives， lots of people wanted to loan her money. She borrowed $125 to invest in her husband's vegetable cart. Then she borrowed more.

　　'I took from one bank to pay the previous one. And I did it again，' says Ms. Taj， 46 years old. In four years， she took a total of four loans from two microlenders in progressively larger amounts —— two for $209， another for $293， and then $356.

　　At the height of her borrowing binge， she says， she bought a television set. The arrival of microfinance 'increased our desires for things we didn't have，' Ms. Taj says. 'We all have dreams.'

　　Today her house is bare except for a floor mat and a pile of kitchen utensils. By selling her TV， appliances and jewelry， she cut her debt to $94. That's equal to roughly a quarter of her annual income.

　　Around Ramanagaram， the silk-making city where Ms. Taj lives， the debt overload is stirring up social tension. Many borrowers complain that the loans' effective interest rates —— which can vary from 24% to 39% annually —— fuel a cycle of indebtedness.

　　In July， town authorities asked India's central bank to either cap those rates or revoke lenders' licenses. 'Otherwise， the present situation may lead to a law-and-order problem in the district，' wrote K.G. Jagdeesh， deputy commissioner for the city of Ramanagaram， in a letter to the central bank.

　　Alpana Killawala， a spokeswoman for the Reserve Bank of India， said in an email that the central bank doesn't as a practice cap interest rates for microlenders but does press them not to charge 'excessive' rates.

　　Meanwhile， local mosque leaders have started telling people in the predominantly Muslim community to stop paying their loans. Borrowers have complied en masse.

　　The mosque leaders are also demanding that lenders give them an accounting of their finances. The lenders say they're not about to comply with that.

　　The repayment revolt has spread to other communities， including the nearby city of Channapatna， and could reach further across India， observers say.

　　'We are very worried about this，' says Vijayalakshmi Das of FWWB India， a company that connects microlenders with financing from mainstream banks. 'Risk management is not a strong point for the majority' of local microfinance providers， she adds. 'Microfinance needs to learn a lesson.'

　　Nationwide， average Indian household debt from microfinance lenders almost quintupled between 2004 and 2009， to about $135 from $27 or so， according to a survey by Sa-Dhan， the industry association. These sums are obviously tiny by global standards. But in rural India， the poorest often subsist on just a few dollars a week.

　　Some observers blame a fundamental shift in the microfinance business for feeding the problem. Traditionally， microlenders were nonprofits focused on community service. In recent years， however， many of the larger microlending firms have registered with the Indian central bank as a type of for-profit finance company. That places them under greater regulatory scrutiny， but also gives them wider access to funding.

　　This change opened the door to more private-equity money. Of the 54 private-equity deals （totaling $1.19 billion） in India's banking and finance sector in the past 18 months， microfinance accounted for 16 deals worth at least $245 million， according to Venture Intelligence， a Chennai-based private-equity research service.

　　Making loans in poorest India sounds inherently risky. But investors argue that the rural developing world has remained largely insulated from the global economic slump.

　　International private-equity funds started taking notice of Indian microfinance in March 2007. That's when Sequoia Capital， a venture-capital firm in Silicon Valley， participated in a $11.5 million share offering by SKS Microfinance Ltd. of Hyderabad， India， one of the world's largest microlenders.

　　'SKS showed the industry how to tap private equity to scale up，' said Arun Natarajan of Venture Intelligence.

　　Numerous deals followed with investors including Boston-based Sandstone Capital， San Francisco-based Valiant Capital， and SVB India Capital Partners， an affiliate of Silicon Valley Bank.

　　As of last December， there were over 100 microfinance-investment funds globally with total estimated assets under management of $6.5 billion， according to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor， or CGAP， a research institute hosted at the World Bank.

　　Over the past year， investors have poured more than $1 billion into the largest microfinance funds managed by companies， a 30% increase. The extra financing will allow the industry to loan out 20% more this year than last， much of it to countries such as the Ukraine， Cambodia and Bosnia， CGAP says.

　　Here in Ramanagaram， Lalitha Sharma recalls when the first microfinance firm arrived seven years ago. Those were heady times for her fellow slum-dwellers： Money flowed freely. Field agents offered loans to people earning as little as $9 a month.

　　They came to Ms. Sharma's door， too.

　　She borrowed $126. Under the loan's terms， she said she would use it to finance a small business —— a snack stand she runs with her husband. Many microfinance providers require loans to be used to fund a business.

　　But Ms. Sharma， a 29-year-old mother of three， acknowledges she lied. 'You have to mention a business to get a loan，' she says. 'There was no other way to get the money.'

　　She used it to pay overdue bills and to buy food for her family. Ms. Sharma earns $8 a week， on average， in a factory where she extracts silk thread from cocoons immersed in boiling water.

　　Over the next four years， she took nine more loans from three different lenders， in progressively larger sums of $209， $272， $335， and $390， according to lending records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

　　A spokesman for BSS Microfinance Private Ltd. of Bangalore， another of her lenders， declined to comment on her borrowing history， citing central-bank privacy rules.

　　This year， she took another $314 loan to pay for her brother-in-law's wedding， again saying the money would be used for business purposes.

　　She also juggled loans from two other microlenders —— $115， $167， and $251 from the Bangalore-based lender Ujjivan， and another $230 from Asmitha Microfin Ltd.

　　Ujjivan confirmed it issued three loans. An Asmitha official said he had a record of a loan to a Ramanagaram resident named Lalitha， but at a different address.

　　'I understand that it is credit， that you have to pay interest， and your debt grows，' Ms. Sharma says. 'But sometimes the problems we have seem like they can only be solved by taking another loan. One problem solved， another created.'

　　Many of the problems in Indian microlending might sound familiar to students of the U.S. mortgage crisis， which was worsened by so-called 'no-documentation' loans and by commission-paid brokers who critics say lacked an incentive to check borrowers' ability to repay.

　　Similarly in India， microlenders' field officers are often paid on commission， giving them financial incentive to issue more loans， according to Ms. Kamath.

　　Lenders are aware that applicants often lie on their paperwork， says Ujjivan's founder， Samit Ghosh. In fact， he says， Ujjivan's field staffers often know the real story. But his organization maintained a policy of 'relying on the information from the customer， rather than our own market intelligence.'

　　He says that policy will now change because of the trouble in Ramanagaram. The lender will 'learn from the situation， so it won't happen again，' he says.

　　It's tough to monitor how borrowers spend their money. Ujjivan used to perform regular 'loan utilization checks，' but stopped because it was so costly. Now it only checks in with people borrowing more than $310， Mr. Ghosh says.

　　Ramanagaram's period of wild borrowing irks some residents. Alamelamma， a 28-year-old vegetable seller， says she has benefited from microfinancing and that the profligate borrowers 'have ruined it for the rest of us.'

　　One gully away， Ms. Sharma， the heavy debtor， has a different view： She would like to see the microlenders kicked out of the community entirely. 'Not just for now， but forever，' she says.