At first glance, Germany’s decision not to insist on compulsory participation by private lenders in the latest bail-out of Greece may seem like a defeat for Chancellor Angela Merkel and Europe’s largest economy. But appearances can be deceiving. On another, more important level, Germany came out of the latest round of brinkmanship exactly where it may well have wanted to be – with the common currency intact and Germany able to motor forward.

　　乍看上去，德国不坚持要求私人贷方必须参与最新希腊纾困行动的决定，对于该国总理安格拉?默克尔(Angela Merkel)和这个欧洲最大的经济体而言，似乎是一场挫败。但这种表象可能带有欺骗性。从另一个更为重要的层面来说，德国走出了最新一轮的边缘政策，且恰恰是在该国很可能希望的节点上——共同货币安然无恙，而德国经济能够继续迅猛前行。

　　These are heady days for Germany. With its torrid 6.1 percent first-quarter growth rate, it leads the field among industrialised nations. While Barack Obama has been exhorting the US to boost its exports, Germany – with just 82m inhabitants – has less vocally remained the world’s second-largest exporter. That has not only generated a huge current account surplus but has contributed two-thirds of Germany’s economic growth over the past decade.

　　这正是德国的大好光景。凭借第一季度高达6.1%的增长率，德国在工业化国家中独领风骚。尽管巴拉克?奥巴马(Barack Obama)一直在倡导美国提振出口，但人口仅为8200万的德国，却不事张扬地保持着全球第二大出口国的地位。在过去10年里，这不仅为德国带来了巨额经常账户盈余，还为德国经济贡献了三分之二的增长。

　　For the first time since 1992, fewer than 3m Germans are unemployed, and inflation – the perennial obsession of the descendants of the Weimar Republic – remains muted. Business people buzz with self-confidence and even a subtler version of the arrogance evident before the integration of East Germany drained $2,000bn from the West and gave rise to the phrase “the sick man of Europe”.

　　1992年以来，德国失业人数首次降到了300万人以下，而长期困扰自魏玛共和国(Weimar Republic)以降历届德国政府的通胀问题，也得到了很好的控制。商界人士信心满满，甚至表现出一种不易觉察的傲慢——在两德统一前，这种傲慢十分明显。统一耗费了西部地区2万亿美元的资金，并创造出了“欧洲病人”这种说法。

　　In her approach to the problems of the eurozone’s periphery, Ms Merkel has cleverly triangulated between the antagonism of the populace to bail-outs and the importance to business of doing (almost) whatever it takes to preserve the euro. That the views of the two constituencies diverge should not be a surprise.

　　在解决欧元区外围国家问题的策略中，默克尔精明地在德国普通民众对（为他国）纾困的抵触情绪与竭尽所能保住欧元对于商界的重要意义之间，找到了一个平衡点。这两个选民群体的观点有异也不足为奇。

　　For German workers, the current prosperity has come at a price. Beginning in 2003, then-chancellor Gerhard Schr?der pushed through a massive “Agenda 2010” reform programme that successfully peeled back the German welfare state (among other things, unemployment benefits were pared to encourage work), relaxed stultifying regulatory practices and created a “grand bargain” with workers.

　　对德国工人而言，当前的经济繁荣来之不易。从2003年开始，时任总理格哈德?施罗德(Gerhard Schr?der)大力推行一项宏大的“2010议程(Agenda 2010)”改革方案，成功地取消了德国福利国家制度（此外，为鼓励就业，还降低了失业救济金水平），放松了死板的监管实践，并与工人们达成了一项“全面协议”。

　　That complex labour agreement traded lower wage demands for greater job security, achieved in part through “short work”, under which lay-offs were avoided by workers reducing their hours. Government subsidies made up part – but not all – of the lost wages. But even for those not on short work, wages were sacrificed on the altar of competitiveness. All told, real incomes dropped by 4.5 percent in the past decade, reports the International Labor Organisation. So Germany has been selling more and keeping its citizens employed without the rising standard of living that capitalism provides.

　　这份复杂的劳工协议，以更低的薪酬要求换来了更大的工作保障，在某种程度上这是通过“短时工作”来实现的——即通过减少工作时长，来避免裁员情况。工资减少额的一部分（并非全部）由政府补贴加以弥补。但即使那些并非短时工作的员工，也出于保持竞争力的需要而在工资上做出了牺牲。总而言之，据国际劳工组织(ILO)报道，过去10年里工人的实际收入降低了4.5%。因此，德国能够在生活水平没有不断提高（资本主义应做到这一点）的情况下，创造更大的出口，并维持国民的就业水平。

　　In that context, the opposition of rank-and-file Germans to the bail-outs should not be surprising. Opinion polls regularly show Germans more strongly against helping Greece than the French or Italians. To accommodate that sentiment, Ms Merkel has stood fast on a second, less controversial bail-out requirement: that Greece intensify its efforts at austerity. Meanwhile, in private conversation, most German businessmen argue for a pragmatic emphasis on safeguarding the euro. Some even back transfer payments to ease crushing Greek debt loads. That shouldn’t be surprising either, given the joyride that German exporters have received from the currency, whose value is held down by the poor performance of weaker members. A dissolution of the eurozone would leave German exporters confronted with a far more expensive currency and a less competitive position.

　　在这种背景下，德国普通民众反对纾困便不足为奇。定期民调显示，与法国人或意大利人相比，德国人对于救助希腊的反对更为强烈。为平息民众的抵触情绪，默克尔在第二种争议更小的纾困条件上毫不让步：希腊应加大紧缩力度。同时，在私下谈话中，大多数德国商界人士都赞成务实地强调保卫欧元的重要性。有些人甚至支持以转移支付来减轻希腊沉重的债务负担。这一点也不奇怪，因为弱小成员国的糟糕表现拖低了欧元汇率，令德国出口商从中受益。欧元区的解体，将使德国出口商面对高昂得多的汇率水平，并影响到他们的竞争地位。

　　With the euro intact and its members lashed at the hip to Germany, the prospects for Germany’s economy glisten. Over the past decade, German competitiveness (as measured by unit labour costs) has improved by 20 percent while that of weaker European countries has remained flat. That allows German companies not only to out-compete other eurozone countries in world markets; it also provides German exporters with an advantage when selling into other European markets, where 60 percent of German exports go.

　　在欧元完好无损，而欧元区国家在德国面前受到惩罚之际，德国的经济前景看好。过去10年间，德国的竞争力（按单位劳动力成本衡量）提升了20%，而欧洲弱国的竞争力则原地没动。这不仅使德国公司在全球市场的竞争中击败了其它欧元区国家，而且使德国出口商在向欧洲其它市场出口时占据了优势——这些市场占到了德国总出口的60%。

　　Like other developed nations, Germany faces tough competition from China and its smaller brethren. But apart from its sensible economic policies, the country benefits from the formidable positioning of its manufacturing sector. It benefits as well from a more intangible factor: underlying discipline and drive for success. With that behind her, Ms Merkel’s influence over eurozone policies will continue to be greater than headline writers sometimes like to acknowledge.

　　与其他发达国家一样，德国也面临着来自中国及其“小兄弟”们的激烈竞争。但除了明智的经济政策，德国还得益于本国制造业的强大定位。同时，德国也得益于一个更无形的因素：根本的纪律和追求成功的动力。凭借这些因素的支持，默克尔在欧元区政策方面的影响力，仍将比媒体作者们有时愿意承认的更大。