中国最近的罢工事件──特别是在广东和珠三角的制成品出口中心──出乎多数观察人士的意料。上海、北京及其周边的用工短缺也不是个别现象。很多地方政府、特别是东部沿海发达地区的地方政府今年已将最低工资标准提高了15%到20%.

　　由劳资纠纷造成的工资暴涨无疑会让北京感到不安。但从长期来看，中国的工资增长应当反映其制造业生产率相当高的增长速度。工资加快增长会给中国和世界其他地方带来很大的好处。首先，中国的工资水平会进一步接近更加成熟的工业国家，从而减轻抵制中国出口商品的保护主义压力。其次，工资水平提高会扭转劳动力占中国国民收入份额的下降趋势。减少企业利润所占的份额（过去几年已变得过高）、提高家庭可支配收入，中国的消费自然就会上去，贸易顺差自然就会下来。

　　为让工资增长更加有迹可循，中国的长期汇率政策应该是怎样的？世界上很多地方，特别是亚洲，其本币汇率都以美元为标准。中国的进出口产品多以美元计价，国际资本流动也是如此。中国净储蓄余额主要体现为流动性美元债权的大量积累。在这个向美元看齐的世界，要鼓励中国工资持续高增长、与生产率增速相匹配，关键是确定完全可靠的人民币兑美元固定汇率。

　　相比之下，强迫中国让人民币升值则会适得其反。如果中国雇主担心人民币汇率会在将来走高，它们就更不愿意在当前承诺大幅增加工资。否则的话，如果出口企业允诺给出人民币高工资过后发现人民币汇率也已经上升，以美元计算的实际工资增幅还要高出许多，那么它们就有可能面临破产。在一个他国（包括美国）竞争产品都用美元计价的世界，人民币兑美元牢牢固定后，中国雇主就可以更加准确地估计，什么样的工资增幅才是和劳动生产率将来的预期增速相匹配的。要是哪一位雇主给的工资少了，其他企业就很有可能挖去他最宝贵的员工。

　　日本以前的经验说明了日圆兑美元汇率对于决定工资增速的重要性。在经历二战过后的通胀乱局与经济失序之后，日本政府于1949年在美国的财务援助之下统一了混乱的汇率（抛弃多种汇率和支付限制），并将汇率中间价固定在360日圆兑一美元的水平。在这种盯住美元的汇率制度下，日本上演战后奇迹：从20世纪50年代早期到1971年，国内生产总值和制造业劳动生产率开始以每年约9%的速度增长，货币工资增长速度达10%以上，超过美国的两倍。在批发物价稳定的情况下，贸易大致实现平衡，国际竞争力也大致平衡。

　　但在1971年8月，美国总统尼克松（Richard Nixon）逼迫其他工业国家──日本、加拿大和西欧国家──对美元升值，震惊世界。尼克松对所有工业进口产品征收了一种关税，直到其他工业国家同意本币升值才予取消。在过后的12月份，所有这几个工业国家都同意升值。日本升值17%.早至1970年，美元贬值预期就造成大量热钱流出美国。外国央行为防止本币升值超过同尼克松约定的幅度，通过买入美元进行了重手干预。这样导致的结果是70年代和80年代世界范围内的货币失控，大通胀，经济周期大起伏，以及经济增长迟滞不前。

　　由于当时日本已经成为美国最大的工业竞争对手，美国开始错误地逼迫日本强制实施日圆的进一步升值。1995年4月，日圆从1971年8月份的360日圆兑一美元升值到80日圆兑一美元。热钱流入开始在一定程度上造成日本80年代末的楼市和股市泡沫。但泡沫在1990年破灭后，加上估值过高的日圆进一步升值，日本经济跌入一轮通货紧缩低迷期，至今尚未复元。到70年代末，货币工资增速已经跌到低于美国的水平；而在2010年，日本的工资水平事实上还出现了下降。

　　中国应当从中吸取什么样的教训？长期来看，汇率升值和货币工资增长是互为替代的。而无迹可循的汇率升值加上与之相关的热钱流入，对经济的长远损害还要大得多。最好是将汇率牢牢地固定在6.83元人民币兑一美元的水平，就跟过去两年一样。然后温和地向反对者解释，北京充分尊重──甚至鼓励──工人善意争取加薪，以匹配制造业生产率的高增长。

　　但美国国会又在威胁，如果人民币不升值，就会对来自中国的进口产品征收惩罚性关税。为控制贸易保护主义的政治风险，中国人民银行在6月19日让人民币对美元脱钩，并成功地──至少是暂时成功地──消解了美方的压力。

　　但如果是系统地让人民币升值，或者是扬言要进行系统性的升值，热钱马上就会重新开始流入，并在更长期内减缓货币工资的增长。另外，不连贯的大幅升值也不会化解局势，因为它不太可能降低美国人如此关注的贸易顺差（即净储蓄）。

　　在这种不必要的政治危机背后，是一种得到普遍认可但实际不成立的经济信条：汇率可以用来控制任何国家的贸易余额，即该国储蓄与投资间的差额。相反，这种不平衡来自于美国的巨额存款缺口──巨大的财政赤字加上极低的个人储蓄率──和中国因高额企业利润、政府收入而产生的“过剩”储蓄。

　　不幸的是，华盛顿仍在进行的人民币汇率辩论不只是分散人们的注意力。事实上，威胁升值很有可能妨碍中国工资水平按制造业劳动生产率增速而增加的自然过程，从而导致更大的劳资冲突，甚至是中国泡沫的日本式破灭。

　　Recent Chinese labor strikes —— particularly in the heartland of manufactured exports in Guangdong and the Pearl River Delta —— have taken most observers by surprise. Labor shortages in and around Shanghai and the Beijing area are also widespread. Many local governments，particularly on the developed eastern seaboard，have increased minimum wages by 15% to 20% this year.

　　A wage explosion fed by labor militancy is obviously disconcerting to Beijing. But in the long term China's wage increases should reflect its remarkably high productivity growth in manufacturing. Higher wage growth would have two great advantages for China and for the rest of the world. First，Chinese wages would become closer to those in the more mature industrial countries，thus reducing protectionist pressures against imports from China. Second，higher wage settlements would reverse labor's declining share in China's national income. With a shift away from business profits —— which have become exorbitantly high in the last several years —— to greater household disposable income，consumption would naturally rise and reduce China's trade surplus.

　　For wages to grow less erratically what should China's long-term exchange-rate policy be？Much of the world， particularly Asia，is on a dollar standard. Most Chinese exports and imports are invoiced in dollars，as are international financial flows. China's net saving surplus is manifested mainly in a huge buildup of liquid dollar claims. In this dollar-based world，a fully credible fix of the yuan/dollar rate is the key to encouraging sustained high growth in Chinese wages that matches productivity growth.

　　In contrast，bashing China to appreciate its currency is counterproductive. If Chinese employers fear that the yuan will be higher in the future，then they become more loath to grant large wage increases in the present. Otherwise，producers of export products could be bankrupted if they granted high wage claims in yuan only to find out afterward that the yuan had also ratcheted upward，making the effective wage increases much larger in dollar terms. In a world where competing goods from other countries （including the U.S.）are all invoiced in dollars，then a safely fixed yuan/dollar rate allows a Chinese employer to estimate more precisely what wage increases are commensurate with expected future growth in labor productivity. If any one employer offers less，others could well bid away his most prized workers.

　　The earlier experience of Japan shows the importance of the yen/dollar rate in determining wage growth. After the inflationary chaos and economic disorganization following World War II，in 1949 the Japanese government with American financial assistance unified the battered currency （got rid of multiple exchange rates and payments restrictions）and fixed the central rate at 360 yen per dollar. With this dollar anchor，the postwar Japanese miracle unfolded：From the early 1950s to 1971，GDP and labor productivity in manufacturing began to grow by about 9% per year while growth in money wages was in excess of 10%，which was more than twice as high as in the U.S. With stable wholesale prices，trade was roughly balanced and so was international competitiveness.

　　But in August 1971，President Richard Nixon shocked the world by forcing the other industrial countries —— Japan，Canada and those in Western Europe —— to appreciate against the dollar. Nixon imposed a tariff on all industrial imports until the other industrial countries agreed to appreciate，which they all did by the following December. Japan appreciated by 17%. As early as 1970，the expectation of dollar depreciation caused huge hot money flows out of the U.S. Foreign central banks intervened heavily to buy dollars to prevent their currencies from appreciating more than what was agreed to with Nixon. The result was a world-wide loss of monetary control，great inflation，large business cycle fluctuations，and slow economic growth in the 1970s into the '80s.

　　Because Japan had by then emerged as America's foremost industrial competitor，the U.S. mistakenly began 'bashing' Japan to force further yen appreciation. The yen rose to a high of 80 per dollar in April 1995 from 360 per dollar in August 1971. Hot money inflows first contributed to land- and stock-market bubbles in Japan in the late 1980s. But after these burst in 1990 and the overvalued yen rose even further，the economy was thrown into a deflationary slump from which it has yet to recover. By the end of the 1970s，money wage growth had slumped to less than in the U.S. —— and Japanese wages are actually falling in 2010.

　　What is the lesson for China here？Exchange rate appreciation and money wage growth are substitutes in the long term. But an erratically appreciating exchange rate with the associated hot money flows does much more long-term damage to the economy. Best to keep the exchange rate safely fixed near 6.83 yuan/dollar —— as it had been for two years. Then gently explain to would-be China bashers that Beijing fully respects —— and even encourages ——workers to bargain in good faith for higher wages to match high productivity growth in manufacturing.

　　Nevertheless，the U.S. Congress is again threatening to impose punitive tariffs on imports from China unless the yuan is appreciated. To contain the political risks from trade protectionism，the People's Bank of China depegged the yuan on June 19 and succeeded in defusing U.S. pressure —— at least temporarily.

　　But any systematic yuan appreciation —— or threat thereof —— will immediately restart the hot money inflows and，in the longer term，slow money wage growth. Moreover，any discrete sharp appreciation won't defuse the situation either because it would be unlikely to reduce China's trade （i.e.，net saving）surplus on which the Americans are so focused.

　　Behind this unnecessary political crisis is a widely held but false economic belief： the idea that the exchange rate can be used to control any country's trade balance —— the difference between its saving and investment. Instead， the imbalance arises from a large saving deficiency in the U.S. —— with very large fiscal deficits and low personal saving —— coupled with 'surplus' saving in China from high business profits and buoyant government revenue.

　　Unfortunately，the yuan/dollar debate that continues in Washington is more than a distraction. Indeed，the threat of appreciation may well impede the natural process by which Chinese wages rise as fast as labor productivity in manufacturing， leading to greater unrest and perhaps even a Japan-like bursting of a Chinese bubble.