China has aroused international alarm by using its virtual monopoly of rare earths as a trade instrument and by stalling multilateral efforts to resolve disputes in the South China Sea. Among its neighbours, there is deep concern at the way it is seeking to make water a political weapon.

　　中国将其对稀土资源的实质性垄断当成一种贸易手段，并阻止旨在解决南中国海争端的多边努力，这已引起了国际社会的警觉。而中国谋求把水资源作为一种政治武器的做法，令其邻国深感忧虑。

　　At the hub of Asia, China is the source of cross-border river flows to the largest number of countries in the world – from Russia to India, Kazakhstan to the Indochina peninsula. This results from its absorption of the ethnic minority homelands that make up 60 per cent of its land mass and are the origin of all the important international rivers flowing out of Chinese territory.

　　中国地处亚洲中心位置，发源自中国境内发源的跨境河流所流向的国家数量堪称全球之最——从俄罗斯到印度，从哈萨克斯坦到印度支那半岛。这是源于中国对少数民族居住地的吸纳——这些少数民族居住地区占到了中国陆地总面积的60%，是从中国流出的所有重要国际河流的发源地。

　　Getting this pre-eminent riparian power to accept water-sharing arrangements or other co-operative institutional mechanisms has proved unsuccessful so far in any basin. Instead, the construction of upstream dams on international rivers such as the Mekong, Brahmaputra or Amur shows China is increasingly bent on unilateral actions, impervious to the concerns of downstream nations.

　　事实证明，迄今为止在任何流域，旨在使这个著名水资源大国接受资源共享协议或其它合作机制的努力都未获成功。相反，在湄公河、雅鲁藏布江或黑龙江等国际河流上游建造的大坝表明，中国越来越倾向于采取单边行动，全然无视下游国家的担忧。

　　China already boasts both the world’s biggest dam (Three Gorges) and a greater total number of dams than the rest of the world combined. It has shifted its focus from internal to international rivers, and graduated from building large dams to building mega-dams. Among its newest dams on the Mekong is the 4,200 megawatt Xiaowan – taller than Paris’s Eiffel Tower. New dams approved for construction include one on the Brahmaputra at Metog (or Motuo in Chinese) that is to be twice the size of the 18,300MW Three Gorges – and sited almost on the disputed border with India.

　　中国不仅号称拥有世界上最大的水坝（三峡大坝），而且其水坝总数超过了全球其它国家的总和。中国已将重点从国内河流转向国际河流，并从建造大型水坝升级为巨型水坝。中国在湄公河流域建造的最新一座大坝，是4200兆瓦的小湾水电站——比巴黎的埃菲尔铁塔还要高。中国获准建造的新水坝包括雅鲁藏布江上的Metog（中文名为“墨脱”）水电站。该电站装机规模将是三峡大坝（1.83万兆瓦）的两倍，所处位置紧邻与印度存在争议的边境地区。

　　The consequences of such frenetic construction are already clear. First, China is in water disputes with almost all its neighbours, from Russia and India to weak client-states such as North Korea and Burma. Second, its new focus on water mega-projects in the homelands of ethnic minorities has triggered tensions over displacement and submergence at a time when the Tibetan plateau, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia have all been wracked by protests against Chinese rule. Third, the projects threaten to replicate in international rivers the degradation haunting China’s internal rivers.

　　这种大坝建造狂潮的后果已十分明显。首先，中国与几乎所有邻国——从俄罗斯和印度，到朝鲜和缅甸等“附庸国”——都发生了围绕水资源的争议。其次，在青藏高原、新疆和内蒙古都爆发了反对中国统治的抗议活动之际，中国最近对少数民族居住地区大型水电项目的关注，引发了围绕移民和土地被淹问题的紧张情绪。第三，这些项目有可能使得中国内陆河流出现的退化问题，在那些国际性河流身上再现。

　　Yet, as if to declare itself the world’s unrivalled hydro-hegemon, China is also the largest dam builder overseas. From Pakistan-held Kashmir to Burma’s troubled Kachin and Shan states, China is building dams in disputed or insurgency-torn areas, despite local backlash. Dam building in Burma has contributed to renewed fighting, ending a 17-year ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army and government.

　　然而，似乎是为了宣称自己是全球无与伦比的水电巨擘，中国也是在海外建设水坝数量最多的国家。中国正不顾当地民众的抵触，在有争议地区或叛乱地区——从巴基斯坦控制的克什米尔，到缅甸动荡不安的克钦和墠邦——建造水坝。在缅甸建设水坝，是导致该地区重燃战火，终结了克钦独立军(Kachin Independence Army)与政府之间长达17年的停战状态的原因之一。

　　For downriver countries, a key concern is China’s opacity on its dam projects. It usually begins work quietly, almost furtively, then presents a project as unalterable and as holding flood-control benefits.

　　对下游国家而言，一个关键的担忧是中国大坝项目的不透明性。中国通常悄然（几乎是偷偷摸摸地）开工，随后则表示项目已无法更改，同时可以带来抵御洪水的好处。

　　Worse, although there are water treaties among states in south and south-east Asia, Beijing rejects the concept of a water-sharing arrangement. It is one of only three countries that voted against the 1997 UN convention laying down rules on the shared resources of international watercourses.

　　更糟糕的是，尽管南亚及东南亚各国都签署了水资源协议，但中国政府拒绝接受水资源共享安排。中国是投票反对1997年联合国建立国际流域共享资源公约仅有的三个国家之一。

　　Yet water is fast becoming a cause of competition and discord between countries in Asia, where per capita freshwater availability is less than half the global average. The growing water stress threatens Asia’s rapid economic growth and carries risks for investors potentially as damaging as non-performing loans, real estate bubbles and political corruption.

　　然而，水资源正迅速成为亚洲各国之间争夺和冲突的根源。亚洲人均淡水可获得量不足全球平均水平的一半。日益增长的水资源压力，威胁到了亚洲快速的经济增长，同时给投资者带来了与不良贷款、地产泡沫和政治腐败同样具有破坏力的风险。

　　By having its hand on Asia’s water tap, China is therefore acquiring tremendous leverage over its neighbours’ behaviour.

　　由于控制着亚洲的“水龙头”，中国对其邻国的行为有着巨大的影响力。

　　That the country controlling the headwaters of major Asian rivers is also a rising superpower, with a muscular confidence increasingly on open display, only compounds the need for international pressure on Beijing to halt its appropriation of shared waters and accept some form of institutionalised co-operation.

　　控制着亚洲主要河流上游的中国，也是一个正在崛起的超级大国，越来越对公开展示自己有着强烈的自信心，而这只会加大国际社会向中国政府施压的必要性，要求其停止“侵占”共享河流，并接受某种形式的合作机制。