It is time to face facts: markets are not just betting against the euro but testing the European project itself. Tuesday’s Franco-German summit showed that the more leaders repeat outdated nostrums – such as the impossibility of eurobonds – the less they are believed. The Merkel-Sarkozy proposals were an attempt to paper over differences (with Germanic prudence on eurobonds and debt ceilings balancing Gallic pressure for economic governance) and buy time, but the past few months have shown that this piecemeal approach will simply increase the cost of a long-term solution. To save itself, the European Union must stop seeking loopholes and attacking symptoms, and instead grapple seriously with its fundamental design faults.

　　是时候直面事实了：市场不只是在看空欧元，也在考验欧洲一体化计划本身。上周二的法德最高领导人会晤显示，领导人物越是重复那些过时的“灵丹妙药”——比如不可能发行欧元债券，他们的话就越没人信。默克尔(Merkel)和萨科齐(Sarkozy)提出的建议旨在掩盖分歧（德国对于欧元债券和债务上限的谨慎态度，平衡了法国在欧元区经济治理问题上施加的压力）和赢得时间，但过去几个月的经验表明，这种零敲碎打的方式只能增加长远解决方案的成本。要想自救，欧盟(EU)必须停止查找漏洞和攻击表面病症，而是应当认真应对自身的根本设计缺陷。

　　Since the French and Dutch “no” votes in 2005, pro-Europeans have acted like the mythical boy with his finger in the dyke; unwilling to give ground for fear of a eurosceptic flood. As a result they have defended the unsatisfactory and unsustainable status quo: a currency not backed by a treasury; joint borders without a common migration policy; and a technocratic foreign policy divorced from national sources of power.

　　自从2005年法国和荷兰投票否决了《欧盟宪法条约》以来，亲欧派们的表现就像那个用手指堵住堤坝的神奇小男孩——因担心欧洲怀疑论的“洪水”决堤而不肯让步。因此，他们一直在捍卫这令人不满又无法维续的现状：有共同货币，却没有财政部的支持；有共同边界，却没有统一的移民政策；技术官僚制定的外交政策与国家权力的源头背道而驰。

　　The only way to stop a tide of disintegration spreading beyond the euro to the EU itself is to tackle these problems head on. Doing so, however, means first giving up the dream of a one-speed Europe. EU nations have long travelled at different speeds, but now they need an institutional framework for a multi-speed future.

　　正面解决这些问题是防止解体趋势由欧元向欧盟蔓延的唯一方式。然而，这么做意味着首先必须放弃“单速欧洲”的梦想。欧盟成员国长期以来的发展速度不尽相同，但现在它们需要一个制度框架来规范“多速”的未来。

　　Rather than hiding this division, the EU now needs a model in which fast-lane nations act as pioneers who endow the whole project with new purpose. Yet even a multispeed Europe needs bigger fiscal transfers – the best option being an explicit deal between creditor and debtor nations. As well as reconciling austerity with debt support, this could develop a vision that balanced economic liberalisation with social protection.

　　欧盟不应掩盖分歧，而是需要采用一种模式，让行驶在快车道的成员国充当先锋，为整个欧洲一体化项目赋予新的目标。然而，即便是一个多速欧洲也需要更大规模的财政转移——最佳选择是债权国和债务国达成一项明确的协议。这么做不仅能够兼顾紧缩措施与债务缩减，还可以形成一种在经济自由化和社会保护之间找到平衡的愿景。

　　Most importantly, Europe’s leaders must stop stripping the politics out of European integration. Instead of shrouding discussions in legalese, they must engage voters in a debate to reinvent the three big integration projects of the past 20 years: the euro, Schengen freedom of movement and a united foreign policy.

　　更重要的一点是，欧洲领导人必须停止把政治与欧洲一体化过程剥离。他们不应进行充满法律术语的隐秘讨论，而应让选民们加入讨论，重造过去20年欧洲一体化的三大项目：欧元、申根签证支持下的自由流动以及统一的外交政策。

　　On the euro – the most existential of the crises – leaders have tried unsuccessfully to stem market panic but not dealt with deeper problems. Even after the latest summit, the policies fall short of the eurobonds, European banking regulation and pan-European deposit insurance schemes that are needed. New rules at the European financial stability facility – allowing it to support banks by buying Greek bonds, and even to recapitalise banks directly – marks a changed German position, whose logic backs new eurobonds. This must now be made explicit, and backed by a big EFSF expansion.

　　在这场危机中，欧元面临最严重的存亡考验。欧洲领导人曾尝试消除市场恐慌情绪，均告失败，但从未试图解决欧元更深层次的问题。即便在最近的这场峰会之后，仍未出台欧洲所需的欧元债券、欧洲银行监管和泛欧存款保险制度的相关政策。欧洲金融稳定安排(EFSF)的新规定允许其通过购买希腊国债向银行提供支持，甚至可以直接对银行实施资本重组，这表明德国的立场发生了转变，而新规的逻辑支持发行欧元债券。这一点目前必须向世人明示，并且辅以EFSF的大规模扩充。

　　EU rules for border-free travel are also under pressure. When borders opened up, hundreds of thousands of refugees were entering Europe; now controls are being reintroduced because of only a few thousand Tunisian incomers. Rather than the current situation in which EU and national policy seem to conflict, a new common migration policy should include co-operation to secure the EU’s external borders, joint criteria for legal migration and a solidarity budget to help certain countries, such as Italy, to cope with sudden and large migratory movements.

　　欧盟有关内部跨境自由流动的规定也面临着压力。当边境开放后，数十万难民涌进了欧洲；而现在，仅仅因为几千名土耳其移民的到来，欧盟就重新采取了管控措施。目前的状况是欧盟和成员国的政策有所抵触，这是不可取的，应当重新制定共同的移民政策，内容包括通过合作保障欧盟外部边界的安全，确立共同的合法移民标准，设立一笔“团结预算”帮助某些国家（比如意大利）应对突如其来的大规模迁移运动。

　　Europe’s foreign policy must also regain credibility. The enlargement project has ground to a halt and the EU, once wooed by Turkey, is now branded comatose, stagnant and geriatric by its prime minister. Europe’s response to the Arab spring is governed by narrow national agricultural and immigration interests, not generosity, and imagination. The admirable action to save Benghazi may, in the long term, expose dwindling defence budgets.

　　欧洲的外交政策也必须重获信任。欧盟扩张计划已经停滞。土耳其先前曾极力向欧盟示好，如今连该国总理都给欧盟贴上了“萎靡不振、死气沉沉、垂垂老矣”的标签。欧洲对“阿拉伯之春”的反应受到了狭隘的国家农业和移民利益的驱动，未体现出宽宏大量，也毫无想象力可言。从长期来看，欧洲拯救班加西的可敬行动或许会曝光欧洲防务预算的日益减少。

　　Rather than relying on national foreign policies coupled with an EU bureaucracy tasked with delivering “enlargement-lite”, EU governments must learn to exercise power collectively towards countries that will never be EU members. A task force to develop a more compelling EU response to the Arab spring, and a commission to strengthen the pooling of defence capabilities would be a good start.

　　欧盟不应依赖成员国的外交政策和以“轻扩张”(enlargement-lite)为己任的欧洲官僚机构，欧盟各国政府必须学会向绝不可能加入欧盟的国家共同行使权力。设立一个特别行动组，推动欧盟对“阿拉伯之春”做出更具说服力的反应，并建立一个委员会，以加强防务能力的集中，这将是一个良好的开端。

　　EU integration has always moved forward through repetitive crises, but only political leadership can turn these into sources of new energy. Thankfully, all of Europe’s problems come from a lack of will, not a lack of military or economic capacity. Even its military spending is second only to that of the US, and around double that of Brazil, India, China and Russia combined.

　　欧盟一体化在前行途中不断遭遇危机，但只有政治领袖们能将危机变成新的能量源泉。值得庆幸的是，欧洲所有的问题都源于缺乏意志力，而不是军事或经济实力不济。欧洲的军费开支甚至仅次于美国，大约是巴西、印度、中国和俄罗斯总和的两倍。

　　The eurozone’s debt and deficits are also far lower than in the US, Japan or even the UK. Yet the EU’s failure to govern itself is fuelling global perceptions of decline, in turn making Europe’s citizens even more short-sighted, as they try to protect their slice of a shrinking cake. EU leaders’ attempts to defend the status quo only reinforce a vicious circle of enfeeblement. Conservatism will not break this cycle of decline. To save Europe, we must reinvent it.

　　欧元区的债务和赤字水平也远远低于美国和日本，甚至都没有英国高。不过，欧盟未能管好自己加剧了全球对于欧洲衰落的印象，这反过来又让欧洲人更加短视，他们正在竭力保护自己那块不断缩小的蛋糕。欧盟领导人维持现状的努力，只不过强化了欧洲不断虚弱的恶性循环。保守主义将无法打破这种衰落的循环。要拯救欧洲，我们必须重造欧洲。