Success stories often have a darker side and, in the case of China’s growth miracle, this lies in the size of the debt burden of its municipalities. Official estimates, which are disputed, show this figure to have trebled since 2007. In 2010, it reached Rmb14,000bn ($2,194bn), or 35 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.

　　成功的背后常常伴有阴影，就中国而言，在它经济增长的奇迹背后，巨额地方债的阴影挥之不去。据官方估计，中国的地方债规模自2007年至今已上涨两倍，对这个数字人们仍有争议。2010年，中国的地方债达到14万亿元人民币（合2.194万亿美元），占中国国内生产总值(GDP)的35%。

　　One reason the estimates are so uncertain is that local authorities were never supposed to borrow in the first place. In spite of an official ban, however, Beijing tacitly allowed them to borrow money from banks by setting up so-called local government financing vehicles. Much of this debt is poorly collateralised, some of it backed by land whose high value risks plummeting in the event of a slowdown. Other loans have been invested in unproductive assets, which are unlikely to generate sufficient revenue to repay them.

　　估算结果之所以带有如此大的不确定性，原因之一是中国地方政府本来就无权借债。然而，尽管官方明令禁止，但对于地方政府通过所谓的地方政府融资平台从银行贷款的行为，中国中央政府却予以默许。大部分地方债的担保情况糟糕：有些债务由土地担保，而一旦经济增长减速，目前土地高昂的价值便可能严重缩水；其他一些债务用于投资购买非生产性资产，这些资产不大可能产生足够的收入来偿还债务。

　　In order to deal with this problem, Beijing is proposing to allow a limited number of local authorities to issue bonds directly for the first time since 1994. This is a significant development and a welcome one. It should oblige local governments to be more transparent about their finances. Hopefully, this will in turn lead to a more disciplined approach to borrowing money. Greater disclosure will allow investors to differentiate between those municipalities which run a tight ship and those that are profligate. This should encourage them to cut borrowings and make better use of the funds which they receive.

　　为了解决这个问题，中国中央政府提出允许有限数量的地方政府直接发债，这是自1994年以来的第一次。这个转变令人瞩目，也受到欢迎。这应当能迫使地方政府在财政方面更加透明化，反过来这也有望规范它们的贷款行为。加大信息披露力度，将使投资者可以区分哪些地方政府量入为出、哪些肆意挥霍。这应该会促使地方政府削减债务，并更好地利用筹得的资金。

　　Both are essential tasks. After all, it seems unlikely that Beijing has liberalised because it sees ideological merit in financial devolution. Rather, it is probably doing so because it is worried about the financial pickle local authorities have got themselves into. Some independent estimates show that the municipal debt burden may be as high as Rmb20,100bn.

　　这两个任务都非常重要。毕竟，中国中央政府放开地方债发行，似乎不大可能是因为看到财政权下放在意识形态上的优点，它这样做，大概是出于对地方政府所处财政困境的担心。据一些独立机构估算，地方债规模可能高达20.1万亿元人民币。

　　Given the seriousness of the problem, the Chinese government should perhaps worry about whether anyone will buy municipal bonds. Over the summer, the Ministry of Finance, has struggled to sell bonds on behalf of local authorities. Unless fiscal discipline is restored, direct sales of municipal paper will be no easier.

　　鉴于地方债问题的严重性，中国政府或许应该担心一个问题：这些地方政府债券会不会有人买。整个夏天，财政部(The Ministry of Finance)一直在努力出售代表地方政府发行的债券，但卖得并不好。除非财政自律得到恢复，地方政府直接发行的债券也不会好卖。

　　One solution is for Beijing to assure that it will bail out local authorities in the event of default, which will in turn require closer monitoring of their spending. This may put central government on the hook for a lot of unwanted liabilities. But it is probably the best way to solve what is a growing local finance headache.

　　解决这个问题的方法之一，是由中央政府提供担保，保证在地方政府违约的时候，中央政府会出手纾困。反过来，这将要求中央政府更严密地监控地方政府的支出情况。这也许会令中央政府对许多它不愿意背负的债务负责。但要解决越来越令人头疼的地方财政难题，这也许是最好的办法。