中文摘要

　　本文的研究是以企业理论中的企业剩余索取权为中心而展开的。企业剩余索取权是指对企业总收入扣除所有的固定合约支付后的剩余额的要求权。本文首先将讨论企业剩余索取权的界定与特征，然后分析其合约安排。本文的分析是以现代企业为基础而进行的。现代企业剩余索取权安排合约主要包括两个方面的内容，其一是企业剩余索取权的分享安排，其二是企业的剩余计量规则及其制定权的安排。其中，对于第一方面，本文限于篇幅将着力于探讨其分享的基本原则，亦即基于企业所有权安排合约基本框架来探讨企业剩余索取权的意义。对于第二方面，企业剩余的计量规则及其制定权的安排问题，本文将提出一个关于企业剩余计量的悖论，而后从实践和理论两方面来解读之。然后本文重点以上述理论研究为指导对中国国有企业改革中的企业剩余索取权安排问题和1840-1997年中国会计规则制定权合约安排的变迁史及进一步变迁的问题进行实证分析。上述这些研讨内容安排于五章中进行，除第1章为“导论”外，其余四章分为上、下两篇。上篇主要是对企业剩余索取权安排进行理论探讨，包括第2、3章；而下篇则是以上篇中的有关研究成果及理论为指导对中国的上述实践问题进行实证分析，包括第4、5章。兹具体介绍如下。

　　第1章 本章系开篇之论，主要是提出本文所要研究的问题，指出本文的研究方法应用和本文讨论所赖以为基础的几个基本假设，并介绍本文的内容章节安排。

　　第2章 本章系讨论企业剩余索取权的界定、特征及意义。经过讨论，本文得出以下几点关于企业剩余索取权的认识：

　　1.企业剩余是指企业合约总收入扣除合约固定总支出后的剩余额，企业剩余索取权就是对该剩余额的索取权（要求权）。企业剩余及其索取权可以有不同的形态，现代企业剩余索取权的常态是企业股东与经营者共享剩余。企业剩余索取权具有状态依存性的特征。企业剩余控制权则是指在企业合约中未予明确的状态出现时的相机处理权（决策权）。

　　2.企业的性质在于其是一份市场里人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约，相对于市场合约而言，它是不完备的。企业合约的不完备性既承续了本文第一章中的思想，又是本章及以后各章讨论的一个基点，它决定了企业剩余索取权与企业剩余控制权，即企业所有权的存在。

　　3.企业所有权安排的基本原则是企业剩余控制权与剩余索取权的安排应相对应。这一基本原则体现于古典企业中，就表现为古典企业所有权安排合约的基本框架——企业股东（业主）独享企业剩余控制权与剩余索取权；体现于现代企业中，则表现为现代企业所有权安排合约的基本框架——企业剩余控制权安排给企业经营者享有，而企业剩余索取权则安排给股东与经营者分享。企业剩余索取权作为一种必要且有效的激励工具的意义在企业所有权安排合约的基本框架中得以彰显。

　　第3章 本章研究企业剩余计量规则及其制定权的合约安排问题，提出了“企业剩余计量悖论”，并从实践和理论的角度成功地解读了该悖论，具体而言：

　　1. 由于企业剩余计量规则存在较大的选择空间，剩余计量会令企业剩余索取权的实际安排偏离其合约安排，故企业剩余计量及其规则制定权的合约安排是企业剩余索取权安排合约的一个必要且重要的组成部分。但无论企业实践，还是企业理论研究工作（实践）均显示出该合约安排不重要，故我们就此提出了“企业剩余计量悖论”。

　　2. 在现代企业中，剩余计量工作是由会计来完成的。我们以交易成本为基本分析工具，并结合证券市场中的“逆向选择”问题分析提出了企业的会计规则（包括剩余计量规则）制定权合约安排的范式，即政府享有一般通用会计规则的制定权，企业经营者享有剩余的会计规则制定权，而由注册会计师监督企业经营者对一般通用会计规则的遵循和剩余的会计规则制定权的适当行使，并通过英美两国现代企业会计规则制定权合约安排的变迁来验证了该范式。在该范式中，一般通用的会计规则以会计准则的形式出现，它是一份公共合约，从企业私人合约中独立出来了。从而，企业剩余索取安排合约、债务合约等私人合约中不必再就一般通用的会计规则作出规定，而并非会计规则（含剩余计量规则）及其制度定权不重要。因此就在实践意义上解读了“企业剩余计量悖论”。

　　3. 我们研究了英美两国的会计规则制定权合约安排之变迁和会计信息的真实性等问题，得出了会计规则制定权合约安排的变迁是一种被动式、诱致性和渐进式变迁；意识形态在该变迁中发挥着重要作用；该变迁呈现“路径依赖”特征；财务会计中包含了注册会计师进行外部审计的安排；……等一系列重要结论和观点。

　　4. 我们认为，现行的企业理论是一种狭义企业理论，应当构建一个包括会计理论在内的广义企业理论框架。在该广义企业理论框架中，企业剩余计量悖论得以顺利解读。对企业剩余计量的理论研究并非不重要，而是很重要，专门有一批学者在研究之，并发展为“会计理论”。

　　第4章 本章主要以上篇中对企业剩余索取权的研究（尤其是基于企业所有权合约安排基本框架的企业剩余索取权之意义分析）为指导，对中国国有企业改革中的企业剩余索取权安排问题进行实证分析。本文通过有关数据分析指出：（1）中国国有企业经营者已享有相当充分的企业剩余控制权，但缺乏认真行使之的有效激励与约束；（2）中国国有企业经营者没有分享企业剩余索取权，且中国国有企业经营者对自己的经济地位很不满意；（3）从而，依据企业所有权安排的基本框架与原则，中国国有企业的下一步改革重点之一就是要进行国有企业剩余索取权安排的改革，应安排国有企业经营者参与企业剩余索取权的分享，其中包括以经营者的长期经营业绩为基础的剩余索取权，即本企业的股票和（或）股票期权。

　　当然，进行国有企业剩余索取权的改革会遇到许多矛盾与困难，但我们应持的态度是，坚持改革开放，在改革中去解决问题，完善各类机制。需予以指出的是，企业剩余索取权的分享并不是一帖“万能药”，它只是国有企业内部治理结构以及国有企业整体改革“药方”中的一味“药”而已，需与其他各味“药”相配合才能产生效用，否则也许会弄得更糟。 其他各味“药”既包括国有企业中宏观层面的产权制度改革，也包括国有企业外部治理结构的变革（如形成充分竞争性的经营者市场、公司控制权市场等），以及国有企业内部治理结构的其他方面改革，如吸纳外部董事，构建强有力的董事会，加强监事会的职能，加强内部权力制衡机制的建设等。进而言之，这其他各味“药”的“药方”可且应一直开到包括中国社会、政治、经济、法律各方面的体制改革与发展，如文中所提到的保护合法收入的法制（治）建设、会计规则制定权合约安排的变迁等等。

　　第5章 本章以上篇中对现代企业会计规则制定权合约安排范式与变迁的研究成果为指导对中国1840-1997年的会计规则制定权合约安排的变迁进行描述与分析。本文对此的研究是通过将之划分为1840-1949年、1949-1980年、1981-1991年、1992-1997年这四个时段而分别加以描述与分析。通过描述与分析，我们认为，1840-1997年中国会计规则制定权合约安排的变迁史就是该时段中国历史的一幅缩影，与其环境特征具有高度的一致性，其变迁途中充满了曲折与坎坷，只有在20世纪的最后两个十年代里，中国会计才真正迎来了发展的“盛世”。此期间中国会计的变迁主要呈现出渐进式变迁、被动式变迁与诱致性变迁的特征，从1980年代开始的变迁中还呈现出强烈的路径依赖特征以及供给主导型变迁与需求主导型变迁并存、交互影响的特征，并在一定程度上滞后于中国经济体制其他方面的变革，阻碍了中国经济的发展。在本世纪余下的时间里和21世纪，在进行包括企业剩余索取权安排在内的公司治理结构等的变迁的同时，中国都必须始终如一着力于加强框架已初步形成的现代企业会计规则制定权合约安排范式的构建，尽快使之真正有效地运转起来，变迁到位。

　　

　　“ Claim to Firm‘s Residue： Sharing Arrangement

　　and Residue Measurement“

　　（Abstract） 

　　This thesis is a cross-study based on economics （particularly， New Institution Economics and The Theory of the Firm） and accounting theory. In detail， the paper is on claim to firm‘s residue which can be defined as the difference between the total revenue and the total payment fixed by contracts entered into by a firm. Moreover， the paper bases its discussion on the modern enterprises which are characterized by the separation of ownership and control.

　　The contract for arranging claim to residue in modern enterprises， strictly speaking， is composed of two subcontracts. One subcontract is the contract for arranging the sharing of claim to residue （i.e.，residual claim）， the other is the contract for arranging the rights of determining rules concerning how to measure firm‘s residue. Both of the two subcontracts are important， the latter acts as a basis for the former in the sense that firm’s residue must be clearly measured before being shared by participants. For now， suffice it to say that residue measurement is one significant function of accounting.

　　As for the subcontract for arranging the sharing of claim to residue， we will mainly discuss the basic sharing principle due to limited coverage of the thesis. To put it another way， we will mainly explore the significance of claim to residue within the fundamental framework of the contract for arranging ownership of the firm. Of course， we will first outline the definition and characteristics of claim to residue. When it comes to the latter， we will suggest a paradox about the measurement of residue， and then explicate it in both practice and concept. After completing all of the above discussion， the thesis will make empirical research into the problem of how to arrange the sharing of claim to residue of State-Owned Enterprises （hereafter“SOEs”） in China， describe and analyze the historical change of contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules （embodying the residue measurement rules） in China （1840-1999） under the guidance of the above theoretical exploration.

　　All of the above content will be discussed in 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is the “Introduction”which suggests the problem that we are to discuss， points out the research method applied in the thesis， explains the basic assumptions and concepts on which the paper base its discussion ，and also introduces the arrangement of the content of the thesis. Other 4 chapters are classified into two parts： part 1，which includes Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 ， mainly explore claim to residue in concept； part 2，which is composed of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5，mainly empirically analyzes the above practical problems under the guidance of the theoretical exploration in part 1.Now，Let‘s outline the content of Chapter 2-5 in detail as following.

　　The definition， characteristics and significance of claim to residue are discussed in Chapter 2.Through detailed discussion， we draw several conclusions about claim to residue. First， claim to residue means as mentioned earlier at the beginning of the abstract. Second， Claim to residue is characterized by “state-contingency”， that is， people who will share claim to residue are contingent on the state of firms′ business operation. Third， what determines the existence of ownership of the firm， which includes claim to residue and residual rights of control as its two indispensable components， is the nature of the firm——an incomplete special contract of the human capital and non-human capital in the market. The last but not the least， claim to residue is an indispensable and effective instrument to give the joint entrepreneurs——shareholders and management ——the incentives to do best what they should do， this is the very significance of claim to residue. In other words， the significance of claim to residue arises from the basic arrangement principle or framework of ownership of the firm， which is to match claim to residue with residual rights of control as far as possibly. As the result， that management owns residual rights of control and shares claim to residue with shareholders is usual phenomenon in modern enterprises.

　　Chapter 3 explores the contractual arrangement of rights of determining residue measurement rules. As mentioned earlier， such contractual arrangement is an indispensable subcontract of the contract for arranging claim to residue， and is as important as the subcontract for arranging the sharing of claim to residue. However， not only business practice but also the research of the theory of the firm， seems to show us that such contractual arrangement is not important. Consequently， we raise the paradox entitled“Firm‘s Residue Measurement Paradox”。 In modern enterprises， the residue measurement function is enforced by accounting system as mentioned previously. Therefore， in order to explicate the paradox， we explore the contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules using transaction cost as a basic analytical instrument， we also examine the “adverse selection” problem in securities market. Through the above discussion， we demonstrate that the paradigm of the contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules in modern market economy system can be described as follows： the government owns the right of determining general accounting rules， and the management of enterprise shares the right of determining residual accounting rules， and the CPAs are responsible for supervising whether the management has practiced in accordance with the general accounting rules and has reasonably exercised the right of determining residual accounting rules. We verify the paradigm through examining the historical change of the contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules in British and American cases. In the paradigm， the general accounting rules determined by the government is usually entitled “accounting standards”，which is a public contract in nature as the result of the institutional innovation which superseded original private contractual arrangement of single enterprise by public contractual arrangement in order to reduce transaction cost and then adapt to the development of modern enterprises. Consequently， it is not that contractual arrangement of determining accounting rules is not important but that such contractual arrangement has become public contract ，the private contracts such as contract for arranging claim to residue， and debt covenant， etc.， needn’t have the provisions about such contractual arrangement as a result .Accordingly， we successfully explicate the paradox in the practical sense. Then， by constructing a generated framework of the theory of the firm， which contains accounting theory， we successfully explicate the paradox from theoretical perspective. In other words， current framework of the theory of the firm is narrow ， in the generated framework constructed by us， the research of residue measurement is not lack of importance but very important， there are a lot of scholars who have specialized in it and develop it as “accounting theory”。

　　Empirical research of the arrangement of claim to residue of SOEs in China is made in Chapter 4. By analyzing the relative data， we draw the following conclusions：（1） the management of SOEs have owned considerably ample rights of residual control， however， there are not effective incentives and constraints to let them perform it seriously；（2） the management of SOEs haven‘t shared claim to residue for now， and they are dissatisfied with their economic state very much；（3） Consequently， according to the basic principle or framework of the contractual arrangement of ownership of the firm discussed previously ， one of SOEs’ reform measures which should be taken by the government is to reform the SOEs‘ current arrangement of claim to residue. To put it in detail， the management of SOEs should be permitted to participate in sharing claim to residue in order to match with the rights of residual control owned by the management. Note that such sharing includes the claim to residue based on the long-term operating performance of the management， such as stock option of the SOEs run by the management. Of course， in order to have satisfactory effect， the above reform measure should be co-operative with other reform measures such as the construction of the contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules of the mentioned paradigm， etc.

　　Chapter 5 describes and analyses the change of contractual arrangement of determining accounting rules in China （1840-1997）。On the ground that when the contractual arrangement changes in essence， we classify the change of such contractual arrangement （1840-1997） into four periods：1840-1949，1949-1980，1981-1991，1992-1997.

　　Then ，we empirically examine the change of the contractual arrangement of each period and draw some empirical conclusions for each period. To mention such conclusions in detail is beyond the scope of this abstract， we would prefer to conclude them in summary. To summarize， the empirical evidence of the change history of the contractual arrangement in China （1840-1997） shows us as follows： （1） Such change is full of twists and turns except the change in the last two decades of 20th century. In effect， it is a true epitome of the whole change of Chinese history in such period. （2） The change is evolutionary， path-dependent， etc.， and is falling behind other reforms of economic system. （3） In China， contractual arrangement of determining accounting rules of modern enterprises in modern market economy system of the paradigm discussed earlier has been constructed preliminarily by now， such change helps to develop the socialist market economy. But effective measures should be taken to facilitate the change and to make the contractual arrangement of the paradigm more perfect and more adaptable to China′s environment.